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Abstract
Cognitive  Robotics  can be defined  as  the  study of  cognitive  phenomena by their  modeling  in  physical 
artifacts  such as robots.  This is a very lively and fascinating field which has already given fundamental 
contributions to our understanding of natural cognition. Nonetheless, robotics has to date addressed mainly 
very basic, low-level cognitive phenomena like sensory-motor coordination, perception, and navigation, and 
it is not clear how the current approach might scale up to explain high-level human cognition. In this paper 
we argue that a promising way to do that is to merge current ideas and methods of 'embodied cognition' with 
the Russian tradition of theoretical psychology which views language not only as a communication system 
but also as a cognitive tool, that is by developing a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics. We substantiate this 
idea by discussing several domains in which language can improve basic cognitive abilities and permit the 
development of high-level cognition: learning, categorization, abstraction, memory,  voluntary control, and 
mental life.
1. Introduction
We can construct robots for at least two different reasons: as useful artifacts or as scientific tools. 
The use of robots as scientific tools is an instance of a new approach to science. Traditionally, 
science has been trying to understand reality through systematic observation and experiment. This 
can be called the 'analytic approach' to science. But since the advent of the computer in the late 
1940's a new kind of approach to science has appeared, one which tries to understand reality by 
modeling it in computers or robots. This is what can be called the 'synthetic approach' to science. 
The rationale for the synthetic approach is that, once you have built a system that reproduces some 
phenomenon of reality, you have a candidate explanation of that phenomenon in that it is possible -- 
even though by no means certain -- that the principles you have used to build your artificial system 
are the same principles that underlie the real phenomenon and explain it. 
The use  of  the  synthetic  approach is  today very common in many scientific  fields.  But  the 
synthetic  approach is  particularly  important  in  Psychology since it  is  at  the core of one of the 
disciplines that contributed to the birth of modern Cognitive Science, namely Artificial Intelligence 
(Bechtel et al., 1998). But while classical cognitive science and artificial intelligence were based on 
the mind-as-a-computer metaphor, in the last twenty years robots have been replacing the computer 
as icons of the human mind. In fact, in the last twenty years a number of overlapping fields of 
investigation  have  emerged  whose  aim is  to  understand  behavior  by  trying  to  reproduce  it  in 
artifacts, like robots, which emphasize the physical and biological basis of organisms: artificial life, 
evolutionary  robotics,  adaptive  behavior,  ecological  neural  networks,  embodied  and  situated 
cognition  etc  (Parisi,  Cecconi,  and  Nolfi,  1990;  Varela  et  al.,  1991;  Clark,  1997;  Pfeifer  and 
Scheier, 1999; Nolfi and Floreano, 2000).
This kind of research has already provided fundamental contributions to our understanding of 
behavior  and  mind,  in  particular  by  pointing  to  the  importance  for  cognitive  processes  of  the 
physical,  dynamical interactions between the organism and its  environment.  But current robotic 
research is still quite far from addressing, let alone explaining, the high-level cognitive capacities 
which are characteristic of human beings.  In this paper we argue that a promising way for bridging 
the gap between today's research in robotics and embodied cognition and a full understanding of 
human cognition is  by developing a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics,  that  is,  by endorsing and 
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developing, within robotic research, the idea of language as a cognitive tool which originated in the 
Russian tradition of Theoretical Psychology.
In the next section we clarify what we mean by 'Cognitive Robotics' and we briefly highlight the 
significance of current research in Cognitive Robotics by framing its role with respect to general 
trends in contemporary Psychology and Cognitive Sciences.  In section 3 we briefly present the 
general Vygotskyan idea of language as a cognitive tool. In section 4 we discuss a number of ways 
in  which  language  can  transform  (improve)  cognitive  processes  like  learning,  categorization, 
abstraction,  memory,  voluntary control,  and mental  life.  Finally,  section 5 draws some general 
conclusions.
2. Cognitive Robotics as a new approach to Cognitive Science
First of all, it might be useful to make a terminological clarification. The term 'Cognitive Robotics' 
can  have at  least  two different  meanings:  (1)  the  use  of  robots  as  research  tools  for  studying 
cognition; (2) the use of robots for studying 'truly cognitive' phenomena, in contrast with 'mere' 
sensory-motor interactions with the environment. According to (1), all kind of work which has the 
scientific goal of understanding behaviour by reproducing it in physical artefacts (robots) can be 
considered as cognitive robotics. In contrast, the second reading of the term 'cognitive robotics' is 
more restrictive. For example, Clark and Grush (1999, p. 12) consider as 'truly cognitive' only those 
phenomena “that  involve off-line reasoning,  vicarious environmental  exploration,  and the like”. 
Cognitive robotics in this more restrictive interpretation currently includes only a very few lines of 
research, and in fact Clark and Grush's aim was to push roboticists 'towards' a cognitive robotics, 
which in 1999 was, in their view, almost an empty field.
Here we do not adhere to Clark and Grush's very restrictive definition of  'cognition'. Rather, as 
many other researchers, both within (Beer, 2003; Harvey et al., 2005) and outside robotics (Thelen 
and Smith, 1994; Kelso, 1995), we prefer to be more liberal and consider as genuinely 'cognitive' all 
kinds of ways of solving adaptively valuable tasks,  which are usually,  if  not always,  based on 
direct, on-line, interactions with the environment. The reason is that by using the same term to refer 
to  both low-level  and high-level  behavioural  capacities  we are more prepared to discover  both 
similarities and differences among behavioural capacities and to examine how high-level capacities 
emerge both evolutionarily and developmentally from low-level ones. However, we recognize that 
clearly  not  all  problems,  and all  different  ways  of  solving  problems,  are  equally  complex  and 
'cognitive'. We think that a continuum exists between low-level cognitive functions and high-level 
ones, and it is certainly true that robotic approaches to cognition have been focusing mostly, if not 
exclusively, on low-level behaviors and capacities, such as perception, sensory-motor coordination, 
and navigation. 
This has both a practical and a theoretical explanation. The practical explanation is just common 
sense: first study what is simple, and then move to the more complex. Since our understanding of 
even low level cognitive phenomena is still rather poor, it is better to focus on low level phenomena 
and then move on to high level ones. But this simple, common-sense rule has also a theoretical 
counterpart. Since the cognitive complexity continuum also has a temporal significance, with lower-
level  competences  preceding  (both  phylogenetically  and ontogenetically)  higher-level  ones,  the 
latter are most likely to be built upon the former and to depend on them. Hence, it is important to 
first understand the more basic forms of cognition and ground the study of more complex forms on 
these more basic forms. This implies adopting a “genetic” approach according to which in order to 
understand the nature of X it is crucial to reconstruct how X has become what it is. This is an 
approach  clearly  related  to  Piaget’s  genetic  epistemology  (Piaget,  1968)  and  contrary  to  the 
approach  of  “good  old-fashioned  artificial  intelligence”  (GOFAI),  which  tried  to  understand 
cognition by directly focusing on the most high-level human cognitive functions (logical theorist, 
chess playing, complex problem solving and the like) and ignoring all the rest. 
In fact, the shift of focus in contemporary research on cognition from high-level to low level 
cognitive capacities has been paralleled, or, more correctly, guided by a theoretical shift from the 
symbol-manipulation  paradigm  of  classical  cognitive  science  to  the  sub-symbolic,  embodied, 
situated, and distributed approaches to cognition which characterize current research on cognition 
(Bechtel et al., 1998; Clark, 2001). And there is no doubt that robotics has been playing a major role 
in the generation and development of these new ideas.
After the connectionist revolution of the mid-eighties (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986), which 
still  involved disembodied and non-situated neural  networks, in the early 1990s behavior-based 
robotics (Brooks, 1991) and the use of neural networks in an Artificial Life perspective (Parisi et 
al., 1990) set the stage for the development of a new theoretical framework. The ‘Artificial Life 
route to Artificial Intelligence’ (Steels and Brooks, 1994) pointed to the fact that natural cognitive 
processes are always 'embodied', 'situated' and (partially) 'distributed' in an organism's environment. 
They are embodied in that the body and its physical properties are critical for the way a given task 
is solved. They are situated because the constraints provided by the environment can also act as 
opportunities for the task’s solution. And they are partially distributed because they do not happen 
only inside  an  organism’s  head,  but  they substantially  depend on the  organism’s  environment, 
which, especially in the human case, includes also artefacts and other agents. These ideas have 
converged with several  different lines of previous work in theoretical psychology (i.e.,  Gibson, 
1979;  Bickhard,  1980;  Norman,  1980),  and  have  been  inspiring  a  lot  of  important  work  in 
contemporary cognitive science (i.e , Hutchins, 1995; Barsalou, 1999; Borghi et al., 2004).
Notwithstanding the importance, from both the practical and the theoretical point of view, of the 
shift  from  high-level  to  low-level  cognitive  capacities  in  cognitive  science  research,  still,  the 
ultimate goal of psychology, and of the cognitive sciences more generally, is to understand human 
cognition, and a skeptic could still claim that it is not clear how far the new ideas of embodied, 
situated,  and  distributed  cognition  can  go  in  explaining  the  more  complex  phenomena  of  the 
cognitive  continuum.  What  is  the  relationship  between  sensory-motor  coordination,  active 
perception,  low-level  adaptive  behavior,  on  one  side,  and  high-level,  human-specific  cognitive 
capacities  of  abstract  reasoning,  complex  decision  making,  logico-mathematical  capacities, 
reflexive thinking, on the other? How can we bridge the gap currently existing between Embodied 
Cognition principles, ideas, and models, and human cognitive capacities?
3. Robotics meets Vygotsky: language as a cognitive tool
In line with other recent proposals (i.e., Clark, 1998, 2006; Zlatev, 2001; Lindblom and Ziemke, 
2003; Clowes and Morse, 2005), here we argue that the most promising way of addressing high-
level,  specifically  human  cognitive  capacities  using  the  new  embodied,  situated,  distributed, 
interactive, view of cognition, is to develop a Vygotskyan cognitive robotics, i.e., to put together the 
cognitive robotics approach with the ideas developed in the first half of the XX century by the 
Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who stressed the importance of language for human cognition. 
(For other, slightly different, attempts to outlining a Vygotskyan robotics see also Dautenhahn and 
Billard, 1999; Kulakov and Stojanov, 2002).
Vygotsky (1962, 1978) claimed that the most important event in human development is when 
two previously unrelated  lines  of  development,  that  of  practical  abilities  and that  of  language, 
converge.  According  to  Vygotsky,  language  or,  more  properly,  linguistically  mediated  social 
interactions,  cause a radical  transformation of elementary cognitive abilities into the high-level, 
specifically human, psychological functions. This happens thanks to a process of internalization of 
the social interactions and relationships which the child entertains with adults and more skilful peers 
in the course of development. It is through this process of internalization that the child develops an 
ability to accomplish increasingly complex cognitive tasks. The basic idea is the following. When 
the child is challenged by a task which she cannot solve but through the help of an adult or a more 
skilled peer, she asks for help, which typically takes the form of linguistic help. Later on, when the 
child is facing the same or a similar task all alone, she can rehearse the social linguistic aid which 
helped her to solve the problem. This is what is called 'private speech'. The linguistic social aid 
coming from adults takes several different forms. Social language helps a child in learning how to 
categorize experience, to focus her attention on important aspects of the environment, to remember 
useful information, to inhibit irrelevant, spontaneous behavior, to sub-divide challenging problems 
into easier sub-problems, to construct a plan for solving complex tasks, and so on and so forth. 
When the child is  talking to herself  she is  just  doing to herself  what  others do to her,  that  is, 
providing all sorts of cognitive aids through linguistic utterances. Once the child has mastered this 
linguistic  self-aid,  private  speech  tends  to  disappear,  but  only  apparently.  In  fact,  it  is  just 
abbreviated and internalized,  becoming inner speech.  Hence,  most,  if  not all,  high-level  human 
cognitive processes are  linguistically  mediated,  in  that  they depend on the use  of  language for 
oneself.
These ideas have been developed in the Russian psychological  tradition (i.e.  Solokov, 1975; 
Luria,  1979)  and elsewhere  (i.e.  Cole,  1996;  for  a  review,  see  Diaz  and Berk,  1992).  But  the 
Vygotskyan view of language as a cognitive tool has been largely ignored in mainstream cognitive 
science, principally because Vygotskyan works began to be translated in English only in the 1960s, 
when developmental psychology was dominated by the more individually oriented theory of Jean 
Piaget. Of course, Piaget recognized the importance of sociality in human behaviour but, at least in 
explaining cognitive development in children,  he put more emphasis than Vygotsky on internal 
organizational  processes and on the child’s  interactions with the non-social  environment.  More 
recently, the Vygotskyan idea of language as a cognitive tool and its role in enhancing cognitive 
functions has been raising increasing interest both in cognitive-science oriented philosophy of mind 
(Dennett, 1991; Carruthers, 2002; Clark, 1998, 2006), and in several areas of psychology (see, for, 
examples, Gentner, 2003; Spelke, 2003; Tomasello, 2003). 
Of course, language did not arise suddenly in its modern form during human evolution, nor is it 
magically acquired during child development. On the contrary, language presupposes a number of 
evolved, specifically human, cognitive capacities that made it possible for it to take its modern form 
during evolution and make it possible for it to be easily acquired during development. In particular, 
human language has probably gone through various stages of evolution during which it has co-
evolved with human non-linguistic cognition, exploiting new and more complex forms of cognition: 
for  example,  an  increased  ability  to  predict  the  consequences  of  one's  own action  (Parisi  and 
Mirolli, 2006), or the ability to self-generate sensory-motor inputs inside the brain, without relying 
on sensory-motor input from the external environment (Parisi, 2007). This co-evolution of linguistic 
and non-linguistic abilities in hominids has most probably led to significant differences between 
human and non-human non-linguistic cognition, in contrast with what Vygotsky appears to have 
assumed.  However,  as  soon  as  language  began  to  be  used  (or  begins  to  be  used  in  child 
development), it had a fundamental influence on all sorts of human cognitive functions, in such a 
way that it may be impossible to develop a human-like cognitive robotics without endowing robots 
with the capacity of using language for themselves as humans do.
4. Towards a (more) Cognitive Robotics
In this section we discuss several ways in which language can improve basic cognitive processes 
thus permitting the development of the high-level cognitive functions which are characteristic of 
humans. We do this by both reviewing (some of) the existing empirical and computational literature 
on  the  topic  and  developing  new ideas  and hypotheses.  Hence,  some  of  our  ideas  have  some 
empirical and computational support, while others are of a more speculative nature. In any case, we 
consider them as promising starting points for future robotic research which aims at understanding 
high-level cognition from an embodied and situated perspective.
4.1 Learning
The  importance  of  linguistic  labels  on  individual  learning  is  surely  the  most  studied  effect  of 
language on cognition, both through empirical investigations and through computational modeling. 
From an empirical point of view, in the recent literature on language acquisition there exists an 
important line of research which has repeatedly and consistently demonstrated that language can 
facilitate  category  learning.  Several  studies  with  subjects  of  different  ages  (from 9  month  old 
children to adults) have in fact demonstrated that providing linguistic input to somebody who is 
learning to categorize objects can substantially ease and speed up the learning process (see, for 
example, Waxman and Markow, 1995; Nazzi and Gopnik, 2001; Yoshida and Smith, 2005). These 
findings strongly suggest that labels have the function of 'inviting' category formation, by guiding 
our attention onto 'meaningful' aspects of our environment and by providing important cues about 
how to categorize them. Nonetheless, the field is only at its very beginnings and much more work 
has still to be done in order to provide a full account of the mechanisms that underlie the role played 
by language in category learning. 
The effects of language on category learning has also been the subject of several computational 
models.  For  example,  Schyns  (1991)  and  Lupyan  (2005)  have  shown  with  neural  network 
simulations how linguistic label can simplify category learning. In fact, providing neural networks 
with labels accompanying perceptually presented objects during learning has been shown to speed 
up category learning (Schyns, 1991) or to improve internal representations of objects, specifically 
of those categories of objects which are more difficult to learn (Lupyan, 2005). In a language-game 
model, Steels and Belpaeme (2005) have shown how the self-organized emergence of a linguistic 
system in a collection of agents can co-evolve with the process of categorization of perceptual 
experiences because of a structural coupling between the 'conceptual' and the 'linguistic' systems. In 
other words, while a populational linguistic system self-organizes, the agents' conceptual system 
adapts itself in order to maximize communicative success.  Finally, using artificial life simulations, 
Cangelosi and colleagues (Cangelosi and Harnad, 2000; Cangelosi et al., 2000) have shown how 
organisms with language can learn to categorize their experience in adaptive ways not only through 
genetic evolution or individual learning by trial and error, but also through social learning, with 
what they call 'symbolic theft'. In the symbolic theft condition learning happens thanks to (a) a pre-
existing  ability  to  categorize  some of  the  stimuli,  and (b)  exposure  to  others'  language,  which 
incorporates information on how to categorize new experiences. The results of those simulations 
have  shown  that  symbolic  theft  can  give  an  adaptive  advantage  with  respect  to  standard 
phylogenetic or individual learning in that it is both significantly faster and less dangerous (you 
don't risk to suffer the cost of errors).
But why should category learning be facilitated by language? What are the mechanisms which 
may underlie this effect? We argue that the facilitatory effect of labels on category learning derives 
from the following two mechanisms: (a) linguistic inputs constitute additional stimuli that focus the 
learner's attention to the specific aspects of perception that are relevant for categorization, and (b) 
language itself can sometimes represent the principal (or even the only) ground on which the learner 
can develop the discriminative  capacities  that  constitute  categorization.  Let's  explain  these two 
points in order.
Hearing the same linguistic  stimulus,  let's  say the word 'red',  when perceiving red cars,  red 
apples and red flowers facilitates  --  or may even induce --  the acknowledgement that  all  those 
different stimuli have something in common, namely the red color. In neural network terms, this 
means that the occurrence of the same activation pattern in the acoustic input units -- namely the 
pattern that corresponds to the sound 'red' -- increases the similarity of the internal representations 
of all red stimuli, and this in turn can help -- or induce -- the network itself to learn that all those 
stimuli belong, to some extent, to the same category, namely that of red things. A similar point has 
already been made in the empirical literature on the topic (see, for example, Waxman, 2004). 
But this is not necessarily the whole story. Though fundamentally correct, this account is partial, 
in that it assumes a substantially 'passive' view of perception and cognition in general. The point is 
that perception depends in a fundamental way on action (similar action-based views of perception 
and cognition in general have been developed, among others, by Gibson, 1979; Bickhard, 2001; Di 
Ferdinando and Parisi, 2004; Gallese and Lakoff, 2005). To categorize means to produce a given 
behavior A when perceiving a certain class of stimuli  and another behavior B when perceiving 
another class of stimuli. It is the need to respond appropriately (and discriminatingly) that makes an 
organism perceive the first class of stimuli as different from the second one. So, when dealing with 
a  categorization  process,  we  must  always  ask  the  following question:  which  is  the  differential 
behavior exhibited by an agent that makes us say that the agent is categorizing some experiences as 
belonging to the same category and other experiences as belonging to another category? We argue 
that, for many human categories the answer might just be: the production of different words! In 
other words, in many cases the human brain learns to represent some patterns of inputs (for example 
those produced by red cars, red apples, and red flowers) as similar to each other and different to 
other  patterns  (those  produced  by  yellow  cars,  yellow  apples,  and  yellow  flowers)  principally 
because it is learning to produce, through its phono-articulatory output units, the same (or different) 
action, which consists in the production of the same (or different) word: 'red' (or 'yellow'). This is 
not to deny that there is some internal 'appreciation' of different colours, nor that there is no genetic 
tendency  to  discriminate  colours:  we  all  know,  from direct  experience,  that  we  have  different 
appreciation of redness and yellowness, and we know from scientific investigations that there is 
some genetically based capacity to discriminate colours in certain ways. The point is that part of the 
specific way a given human being categorizes experiences (in this case, related to colour) is in fact 
due to the way s/he learns to name them. In other words,  according to this view, the amazing 
amount of categories that humans can have is in great part due to the role played by language in 
providing a behavioural ground for categorization.
4.2 Categorization
The effect of language on learning is surely very important, and deserves further attention, but it 
still cannot be considered as a demonstration of the Vygotskyan thesis of language as a cognitive 
tool. It is rather a demonstration of the power of social learning: in the special case, which is clearly 
fundamental for human beings, in which social learning is mediated by language. But language does 
not only facilitate category learning. It can also improve categorization once categories have already 
been learned. We have recently demonstrated this with a neural network model (Mirolli and Parisi, 
2005a, 2006). 
We modeled the 'child's brain' as a modular neural net, composed of two sub-networks (which 
we call 'sensory-motor' and 'linguistic', respectively) with reciprocal interconnections between the 
two layers of hidden units. In a first phase (from birth to 1 year) the sensory-motor net learns to 
respond  to  perceived  objects  by  producing  motor  actions  which  are  appropriate  to  objects' 
categories, while the linguistic net learns to imitate heard sounds (words). In a subsequent phase 
(from 1 year on), the connection weights which link the two sub-networks are trained so that the 
whole network learns to associate the internal representations of perceived objects (i.e., the patterns 
of activation of the sensory-motor hidden units) with the internal representations of instances of the 
names of the appropriate categories (i.e. the patterns of activation of the linguistic hidden units). 
After learning the network could both correctly name perceived objects (i.e., produce an instance of 
the correct word through its linguistic output units) and comprehend perceived words (i.e., produce 
the appropriate action through its sensory-motor output units). We then analyzed the effects of the 
learned mapping between objects and their names on categorization. 
In a neural network, the quality of categorization can be quantitatively measured in the following 
way. We can consider the particular activation pattern observed in the network’s hidden units at any 
given time as one specific point in an abstract hyperspace with as many dimensions as the number 
of hidden units, where the coordinate of the point for each dimension is the activation level of the 
corresponding unit. Categories are ‘clouds’ of points in this abstract hyperspace,  that is, sets of 
points elicited by sensory inputs that must be responded to with the same motor output. Different 
categories are different clouds of points. Good categories are clouds of points that are (a) small 
(objects that must be responded to with the same action are represented as similar), and (b) distant 
from  each  other  (objects  that  must  be  responded  to  with  different  actions  are  represented  as 
different). Property (a) can be measured as the average distance between all the points belonging to 
a category and the category centroid, while property (b) can be measured as the distance between 
the categories' centroids. 
Our model demonstrated that learning the mapping between pre-linguistically learned concepts 
and linguistic labels changes the internal representations of objects. In fact, after having learned the 
mapping,  the  internal  representations  of  the  non-linguistic,  sensory-motor  network  tend  to  be 
influenced not only by the non-linguistic sensory inputs but also by the linguistic network. This has 
the effect that the non-linguistic categories tend to become better categories, in the sense that the 
clouds of internal representations of objects belonging to different categories become smaller and 
more  distant  from  each  other.  And  since  an  organism's  categories  influence  the  organisms 
behaviour  by making it  easier  for  the  organism to select  the  appropriate  action in response  to 
sensory inputs, an organism endowed with language will have a more effective behaviour. In our 
model we demonstrated this facilitatory effect of language on categorization not only in the case in 
which language is social, that is, when perceived words are produced by other individuals (Mirolli 
and Parisi, 2005a), but also when language is self-produced, that is, when the agent (the network) 
talks to itself. And this happens both when talking to oneself is external, as in private speech, and 
when it is internal, as in inner speech (Mirolli and Parisi, 2006). These results represent, to the best 
of  our  knowledge,  the  first  example  of  a  computational  model  which  directly  supports  the 
Vygotskyan idea that social language can improve basic individual cognitive abilities through a 
process of internalization of linguistically-mediated social aid.
4.3 Abstraction
The effects of linguistic labels on internal categorization have further important consequences with 
respect to the process of abstraction. Categorization requires abstraction. In order to respond in the 
same way to different stimuli which belong to the same category you need to abstract from their 
differences. And, vice versa, in order to respond in different ways to similar stimuli which belong to 
different categories you have to abstract from their similarities. So, reducing the size of a category's 
cloud  is  improving  the  first  kind  of  abstraction  (ignoring  differences  between  intra-category 
stimuli), while increasing the distance between clouds is improving the second kind of abstraction 
(ignoring the similarities between inter-category stimuli).
The model just discussed had one fundamental simplification: each object had one and only one 
specific action associated with it. This is a clear limitation, since for real organisms typically the 
same object can evoke several different responses, depending on the context. For example, an apple 
can be eaten, thrown, given to another person, and so on. In other words, depending on the context, 
the same object can be categorized in different ways – in the apple example, as food, weapon, or 
present. This means that the internal representation of an object must be multi-functional, in the 
sense  that  it  must  allow  the  organism  to  consider  the  same  object  as  belonging  to  different 
categories depending on the circumstances. Linguistic labels can help organisms to abstract away 
from the possible ways in which an object  can be categorized which are not relevant from the 
current situation, and focus only on the categorization which is relevant. 
Furthermore,  labels  can  also  induce  hierarchical  categorization.  Representations  can  be 
hierarchically organized in the sense that two sets of sensory inputs can be responded to by two 
different actions, and therefore they constitute two distinct clouds of points, but there is a third 
action with which the organism responds to both sets of sensory inputs. Therefore there is a third 
cloud of points that includes both the first and second clouds of points. Language can favour the 
creation of hierarchies of clouds of points just because it provides hierarchies of labels: there are 
two linguistic signals, e.g., "dog" and "cat", that correspond to two distinct clouds of points, and 
there is third linguistic signal, "pet", that evokes the point located centrally in the larger cloud of 
points including the "dog" cloud and the "cat" cloud . 
The idea that labels can play a critical role in the process of abstraction has received empirical 
support in the contest of relational thinking, with studies on both humans and chimps (for a review, 
see  Gentner,  2003).  In  two  series  of  experiments  with  children,  Gentner  and  her  collegues 
(Rattermann and Gentner, 1998; Loewenstein and Gentner, 2005) clearly demonstrated that the use 
of relational language helped children to solve analogical (relational) mapping tasks across a wide 
range of ages and task difficulties. Indeed, Gentner et al. provided evidence for the Vygotskyan 
hypothesis that linguistic aid undergoes a process of internalization: while younger children need to 
be provided with relational language even for solving simple tasks, older children do not, but they 
need  linguistic  help  if  confronted  with  more  difficult  tasks.  These  studies  clearly  point  to  the 
importance of language for reasoning on abstract (relational) properties of the world. In fact,  it 
seems that acquiring and using a name for describing a relational pattern helps the child to abstract 
that pattern from the concrete context in which it has been experienced and thus it increases the 
probability that the same abstract pattern is recognized the next time it is encountered. In other 
words, labeling an abstract (in this case, relational, but the point can be generalized to any kind of 
abstract labels) property changes the perceptual apparatus of the child, in that it  can render the 
property in some sense directly perceivable. 
The  most  impressive  evidence  for  this  view  comes  from  empirical  work  on  chimpanzees 
(Thompson et al., 1997, see also Oden et al., 2001). Chimps (as several other animals) can learn 
quite easily to succeed in a match-to-sample task: that is, to choose, among two different objects, 
the object which matches a sample object (given an A as the sample, the chimp has to choose an A 
against a B). Normal, i.e., non-linguistically-enculturated, chimps were not able to learn and solve a 
relational-matching task: that is, to choose, among two pairs of objects, the pair whose objects are 
in the same relation as the ones of the sample pair (given an AA as sample, the chimp has to choose 
a BB pair against a CD one). Most strikingly, chimps which had been previously trained to use two 
different symbols for the two relations 'sameness' and 'difference' were able to solve the relational-
matching  task.  Note  that  in  order  to  solve  the  relational-matching  task chimps must  apply  the 
same/different distinction at the relational level, that is, at the level of the relation between objects. 
So, in order to solve this second-order problem (judging relations between relations) all it is needed 
is to reduce it to a first order one (judging relations between objects), which we know chimps are 
able to solve. And this is exactly what language training seems to do: practicing with relational 
symbols seem to change chimps' perception, so that linguistically trained chimps are able to 'see' the 
relation  holding  between  two  objects  so  that  they  have  just  to  decide  whether  two  perceived 
relations are same or different (beside the original paper of Thompson and colleagues, see Clark, 
2006 for a similar analysis of the same experiments). 
These studies seem to suggest that training in linguistic tasks changes the way an agent perceives 
its world. The interactions with the world of a linguistically trained animal is mediated by linguistic 
forms, which render some of the aspects of experience more salient than others. The process is 
recursive: once you have learned to see the world in certain ways you can also discover new, more 
abstract patterns. For example, recognizing that sometimes you are looking at the colour while in 
other occasions you are looking at the form of objects, thus allowing the development of more and 
more abstract concepts, like the concepts of 'colour' and 'form'. In other words, a non-linguistically 
trained animal which is able to react appropriately to stimuli of different colours (red vs. yellow) 
has surely different representations of those stimuli. But it probably doesn't have the concept of 
'redness' vs. 'yellowness', and it surely doesn't have the even more abstract concepts of 'colour' vs. 
'form', not to speak about the still more abstract concept of 'property' (of which 'colour' and 'form' 
are two instances). Our abilities of constructing more and more abstract categories depends on our 
ability to label discovered categories and hence reason on those categories themselves.  The reason 
is  that  the  language  user  can  apply  his/her  cognitive  processes  not  only  to  simple  perceptual 
experiences, but also to the 'concepts' themselves, which are made perceivable through the linguistic 
labels.
4.4 Memory
Another  example  of the  importance  of language for cognition concerns memory.  For  example, 
Clowes and Morse (2005) presented artificial life simulations in which agents had to respond to 
external commands in order to perform a simple task. By comparing the results of three different 
experimental conditions, they showed that agents who could repeat to themselves heard commands 
performed significantly better than agents who could not. Similarly, with a simple artificial  life 
model we have investigated the effect of using signals as individual memory aids on the evolution 
of a simple communication system (Mirolli and Parisi, 2005b). In particular, our simulations show 
that  using  signals  not  only  for  communicating  information  to  other  individuals,  but  also  for 
remembering the information received by other organisms, the evolution of signals is favoured, and 
this has a clear positive impact on the organisms’ fitness as well. 
These  are  just  the  very  first  steps  in  the  study of  the  importance  of  language  for  memory 
processes. For example, in contrast with what happens in our simplified models, in real brains the 
non-linguistic and the linguistic networks have a significantly different size. Specifically, the non-
linguistic network appears to be much larger than the linguistic one, in terms of number of units and 
connections  of  which  the  two  networks  are  composed  (Mirolli  et  al.,  2007).  This  simple  fact 
provides a clear advantage for the specifically human linguistic memory system with respect to the 
older  non-linguistic  memory  system which  we  share  with  other  animals.  In  other  words,  it  is 
generally easier to remember words than the actual sensory-motor experiences to which words are 
associated. This, in turn, has the consequence that an organism possessing language can work more 
easily with linguistic (sound) information and translate this information into the associated non-
linguistic  information  when  necessary.  Furthermore,  possessing  a  linguistic  memory  system in 
addition  to  the  older  sensory-motor  one  has  a  second,  fundamental  advantage:  delegating  the 
memory function to the linguistic system leaves the sensory-motor system free to process other 
information  useful  for  acting  in  the  environment  while  linguistically  remembering  previous 
information.
The  importance  of  language  for  human  memory  has  been  also  demonstrated  by  empirical 
research. Both psychological and neuroscientific evidences in fact demonstrate that humans have at 
least two distinct working memory systems: the first is a multi-modal system which we share with 
non-human  primates;  the  second  is  linguistic,  and  hence  species-specific  (see,  for  example, 
Baddeley,  1992; Petrides et  al.,  1993; Becker and Morris,  1999).  Recent  neuro-imaging studies 
have also been discovering the neural basis of these memory systems, suggesting that the linguistic 
memory system is  subserved by mostly  left-hemispheric  areas  which underlie  normal  (audible) 
speech (see,  for example, Gruber,  2002; for a detailed review see Gruber and Goschke,  2004). 
Furthermore, in many circumstances verbal memory seems to be more efficient and flexible than 
the older multi-modal system, and therefore it seems to be the predominant rehearsal mechanism, 
although it may function in cooperation with the older multi-modal system. For example, a number 
of  studies  using  different  experimental  paradigms  have  consistently  shown  that  articulatory 
suppression significantly increases the difficulty of a task by making it more difficult to retrieve the 
task’s goal (see, for example, Baddeley et al., 2001; Emerson and Miyake, 2003; Miyake et al., 
2004).  This  strongly  suggests  that  normally  it  is  inner  speech  that  is  used  for  retrieving  and 
activating relevant information for solving a given task. 
The advantages of possessing a linguistic memory system for short-term processes may extend to 
long-term memory.  Instead of  memorizing full  experiences  a  human being can label  them and 
memorize  their  verbal  description.  Thanks to the abstracting power  of language,  what  is  to  be 
remembered now are just the most relevant features of a given experience. And thanks to the small 
size of the linguistic network, those relevant features are coded in a very efficient way, so that they 
can be easily memorized and recalled. It may well  be that it is thanks to the possibility of this 
linguistic  coding,  memorizing,  and recalling that  human beings are able to  recall  events  which 
happened in their very distant past. This hypothesis could also explain why our memories never go 
too far in our past. Typically, the first memories never date back before about the third or fourth 
year of life. This is just the age at which private speech begins to appear in the child (Berk, 1994). It 
is possible that we can't recall anything about our first three or four years of life because in those 
years we haven't learnt to label our own experiences and to memorize them in verbal form yet. 
4.5 Voluntary control
Finally,  another  fundamental  consequence of the internalization of linguistic stimulation for the 
purpose of guiding one's actions is the development of voluntary control. As discussed above, an 
animal's  ability  to  voluntarily  control  its  own  actions  is  very  limited.  Non-human  animals  are 
fundamentally stimulus-driven: they are both very limited in their capacity to include non-perceived 
objects  in their  problem-solving,  and easily distracted by non-relevant  stimuli,  in that  they can 
hardly inhibit their instinctual responses to highly motivating stimuli.  Of course, under the same 
conditions human beings experience the same kind of difficulties, but we are able to overcome them 
in ways which are not accessible to other animals. We can control our behavior, we can focus on 
our tasks, and we can inhibit our instinctual responses to even the most motivating stimuli. And we 
develop these abilities through the internalization of suggestions and commands which we receive 
from other individuals -- most notably, our parents -- during our infancy. 
The idea is once more the same. The behavior of the child is constantly controlled,  through 
linguistic stimulation, by other people: during all our infancy, we are continually instructed about 
all kinds of do’s (wash your hand, clean your teeth, do your home-work, etc.) and don’t’s (don't get 
dirty, don't eat sweets, don't watch too much TV, etc.). Once an individual has experienced the 
positive effects of being guided by linguistic stimuli produced by other individuals, she learns, by 
imitation, to linguistically stimulate herself in the same way to produce the same effects. That is, 
she starts to talk to herself as a means for controlling her own behaviour. It is in this way, we argue, 
that  we learn to do what  we know is  important  for us  but  we don't  like too much to do and, 
conversely,  to  prevent  ourselves  from  doing  what  we  are  motivated  to  do  but  we  know  we 
shouldn't. This is what, later on, we call voluntary control, or Will.
The fundamental role that language (in the form of inner speech) plays in the voluntary control 
of action is demonstrated by empirical work on the effects of articulatory suppression on the task-
switching cited above. In fact, these studies consistently show that talking-to-oneself is essential 
when  we  engage  in  goal-directed  behaviour.  But  besides  providing  an  efficient  means  for 
remembering task information (the goal you are pursuing), language can help the development of 
voluntary  control  also  as  a  powerful  means  of  abstraction.  Recent  studies  on  language-trained 
chimpanzees  seem  to  provide  this  kind  of  evidence  (Boysen  et  al.,  1996).  Boysen  and  her 
colleagues presented chimps with two bowls containing different numbers of candies. The animal is 
given the bowl which it doesn't point to. Hence, to get the most rewarding result the chimp has to 
point to the bowl containing the smaller number of candies. Surprisingly, chimps never learned to 
do this. But if the same chimps, which had previously been taught symbols referring to numerals, 
were presented with numerical symbols instead of candies,  they quickly learned to point to the 
smaller  numerical  symbol  in  order  to  get  the  larger  quantity  of  candies.  This  result  seems  to 
demonstrate  that  the  use  of  (numerical)  symbols  can  enable  chimps  to  control  their  otherwise 
overwhelming food-related responses. And this is possible just because of the abstractness of the 
symbols. When presented with symbols, in fact, the chimps could just focus on the information 
which is relevant for solving the task, while when presented with real food, the richness of the 
sensory stimulus prevented them from inhibiting their responses in order to reason on the strategy to 
adopt.
4.6 Mental life
Finally, language might play a major role in the most striking and peculiar characteristic of human 
mind, that is, human mental life (as argued also by Dennett, 1991). Human beings have a very rich 
mental life which includes visual and motor images, rememberings, dreams, hallucinations, and so 
on.  Mental  life  can be considered as the self-generation of one's  own input  (Parisi,  2007).  For 
example, mental images are self-generated input (typically visual input, but we can imagine any 
kind  of  sensory-input,  including  proprioceptive  ones)  which  generally  we  have  not  recently 
received but is actively produced by the nervous system itself;  rememberings are self-generated 
input which we know we have not received recently but we also know that we have received in the 
past;  dreams  are  self-generated  inputs  that  occur  when  one  is  asleep;  hallucinations  are  self-
generated input that we erroneously believe is coming from the external environment; and so on. 
The first and most obvious reason why language plays a fundamental role in human mental life is 
simply because a great part of our self-generated input is linguistic: in other words, a large part of 
our mental life is constituted by internally talking to oneself, that is, by inner speech. But the role of 
language in mental life might go well beyond this. In what follows we will try to explain why.
Learning to self-generate one's own input appears to be associated with learning to predict the 
consequences of one's own actions. By learning to self-generate one’s own input one can learn how 
to control one’s own behaviour. Afterwards, this capability can become internal by means of the 
association of the context to the sensory-motor trace of the effects of one’s own actions. In other 
words, after I have learned to induce to myself a sensory-motor experience by manipulating the 
external environment, I can learn to do the same but just internally by predicting the sensory-motor 
experience I would have if I would do the appropriate actions. This is how we learn to internally 
self-generate our own input. Indeed, it may well be that we learn to do this first with words, and 
then with  all  other  modalities,  because  language  constitutes  the  easiest  domain for  learning to 
predict the consequences of one's actions. 
The linguistic system is different from the other sensory-motor systems because in the linguistic 
system the  mapping between input  and output  is  more  direct,  complete,  and stable:  when you 
produce a sound, you can predict very reliably the acoustic input that you will receive as a result. 
This is not true for other kind of sensory-motor systems. In fact, it  is true only for very simple 
movements (you can reliably predict the proprioceptive input given some motor command) and in 
fact  there  are  many  circuits  devoted  to  this  kind  of  prediction  (Kawato,  1999;  Wolpert  and 
Flanagan, 2001) whose principal function is to provide self-generated proprioceptive feed-back in 
cases in which the real feed-back would be too slow for the behaviour to occur properly (Clark and 
Grush, 1999). But the input which is self-generated by internal models is just proprioceptive, so it is 
useful just in the sensorymotor coordination of the organism itself, not for other more complex 
kinds of activity.
The situation for the linguistic system is different, for several reasons. First, the linguistic input 
which  we  receive  as  a  consequence  of  our  phono-articulatory  actions  is  almost  completely 
determined by the phono-articulatory action itself. Second, these consequences of our actions are 
always present (we cannot but hear what we say), and, thanks to the importance of language for our 
cognition,  we always pay attention to linguistic  input.  This  makes learning to predict  our own 
linguistic stimuli  given our linguistic action very straightforward. Furthermore, linguistic tokens 
have meanings, in the sense that they are associated with other sensory-motor experiences which 
are relevant  to  the organism and which they tend to restore.  This simple fact  renders the self-
generation of linguistic stimuli particularly important in that self-generating a word will cause the 
self-generation of a non-linguistic sensory-motor experience which is associated to the word. In 
other  words,  both  the  association  between the  phono-articulatory  movements  and  the  resulting 
acoustic sounds and the association between a given sound (word) and its  meaning (that is the 
sensory-motor  experience  associated  with  that  word)  are  very  systematic,  reliable,  and  almost 
immediate for a developing child. This makes it easy for the child to learn to self-generate his or her 
own (non-linguistic) input by simply producing the words which are associated to the particular 
sensory-motor experience he or she wants to have. 
On the other hand, how can a non-linguistic animal self-induce some experience? On the one 
side,  it  can self-generate  proprioceptive  inputs  by its  internal  models;  on the other  side,  it  can 
control the input it receives by (overtly) directing its attention towards the desired objects. But how 
could it learn to direct its attention towards something which is not in the immediate surroundings? 
And hence, how could it learn to have mental images or rememberings, that is, to self-generate the 
experience of something which is not present here and now?
There is no real (external) action you can do in order to let you perceive the visual image of the 
Coliseum if you are not in front of it or very close to it. So there is no way in which you can 
internalize this ability by just thinking about that same action and self-generating (predicting) the 
consequences of it. But if you have learnt to associate the visual stimulus of the Coliseum and the 
word ‘Coliseum’ so that hearing that word will tend to re-activate the internal experience of seeing 
the Coliseum, then you just need to produce the word by yourself  and listen to what you have 
produced and you can re-experience the Coliseum. Furthermore, since it is very easy to predict the 
acoustic  effects  of  your  phono-articulatory  movements,  the  whole  process  can  be  easily 
internalized: next time you want to re-experience the visual image of the Coliseum, just think about 
producing its name, this will activate in you the experience of the word which in turn will activate 
the desired visual image.
5. Conclusion
A new framework is emerging in the contemporary science of behavior which considers cognition 
as "environmentally embedded, corporeally embodied, and neurally embrained." (van Gelder, 1999, 
pag. 244). Within this framework, a fundamental role is played by Cognitive Robotics, that is the 
use of robots as research tools for studying cognition. But up to now robotics research has been able 
to address only low level cognitive phenomena, and it is currently not clear how can these basic 
models be extended to explain higher level cognition.  In this paper we argued that a new, very 
promising line of research for understanding increasingly high-level cognitive phenomena from the 
standpoint of contemporary research in embodied and situated cognition is to merge the basic ideas 
and synthetic methods of contemporary robotic research with the theoretical tradition in Russian 
psychology which considers language not only as a complex communication system but also a 
powerful cognitive tool. We have elaborated this idea by discussing a number of ways in which 
language can improve cognition. In particular, by reviewing both the empirical and computational 
literature and developing original ideas and hypotheses we have discussed the possible role that 
language might play in such cognitive phenomena as learning, categorization, abstraction, memory, 
voluntary control, and mental life. 
An important aspect of our discussion that should be emphasized is that most of the advantages 
provided by talking to oneself do not seem to require a complex, syntactic language, but just the 
symbolic capacity to associate meanings,  i.e.,  internal representations of significant experiences, 
with linguistic labels. This is important for at least two reasons. First of all, it suggests that the 
discovery of individual, cognitive uses of language could have happened quite early in language 
evolution,  in  particular,  before  the  transition  from an  holistic  proto-language  to  the  full-blown 
compositional language of modern humans. This means that the evolution of language itself could 
have been favoured and partially driven by this individual, cognitive function of language (Mirolli 
and Parisi, 2005b, 2006; Parisi and Mirolli, 2007). Steels (2003) has provided some preliminary 
computational support to this idea: discussing one of his computational experiments in which agents 
had to evolve a compositional language, Steels reports that focussing one’s attention to the self-
produced linguistic utterances proved to be necessary for a population of agents playing a language 
game to develop a linguistic system with case grammar. But still more important for our purposes is 
that, since most of the advantages of talking to oneself seem to require only the symbolic property 
of  language,  i.e.,  the  mapping  between  linguistic  forms and  meanings,  studying  the  effects  of 
language on cognition through robotic models is possible today, without the need for waiting for 
good, working robotic models of complex (grammatical) language acquisition. On the contrary, for 
the reasons just discussed, it is also possible that the development of self-talking robots might help 
us develop good models of grammatical language acquisition.
Of course, we are aware that most of our ideas are currently just speculations, even if sometimes 
supported by empirical findings and/or simple computational models. In fact, these ideas represent 
for  us  just  a  possible  starting point  for  future  Cognitive  Robotics  research.  We hope we have 
demonstrated that studying the effects of language on cognition is one of the most important and 
promising way of  trying  to understand human cognition  from the  standpoint  of  embodied  and 
situated cognition. Indeed, we are convinced that a fundamental step forward in our understanding 
of the human mind will be made as theoretical (and empirical) psychology and robotics will unite in 
studying  the  role  of  language  as  a  cognitive  tool,  that  is,  as  current  robotics  will  become  a 
Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics.
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